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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MIGDAD KARADZA,
Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 48178-2020 & 48179-2020
Ada County Case Nos.
CR01-18-54346 & CR01-20-15079

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1. Should this Court dismiss without considering the merits of Karadza’s consolidated
appeals because he failed to file timely notices of appeal in either of the criminal cases
below?
2. Has Karadza failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when, following a
conviction for grand theft, it revoked his existing probation and executed the underlying
sentence, and imposed a concurrent sentence of nine years with two years fixed on the
grand theft conviction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Dismiss Because Karadza Did Not File Timely Notices Of Appeal
“The filing of a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592,
594, 199 P.3d 769, 771 (2008). “An appellant’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction and requires dismissal of the appeal.” State v. Schultz, 147 Idaho
675, 677, 214 P.3d 661, 663 (Ct. App. 2009). To be timely, the notice of appeal must be filed
within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment or order appealed from. I.A.R. 14(a).
This is a consolidated appeal in which Karadza failed to file timely notices of appeal in
either of the two criminal cases below. In No. 48179 (associated with CR01-20-15079), Karadza
“appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) In No. 48178
(associated with CR01-18-54346), he appeals from “the district court’s order revoking his
probation and executing [the underlying sentence].” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Both the judgment
of conviction in No. 48179 and the order revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence
in No. 48178 were entered on June 4, 2020. (48179 R., pp. 44-47; 48178 R., pp. 129-32.) In both
cases, Karadza filed notices of appeal forty-six days later on July 20, 2020. (48179 R., pp. 53-55;
48178 R., pp. 135-37.) The time to file notices of appeal was not extended by the filing of any
motion. Under Idaho Appellate Rule 14,
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action
is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the
judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the
action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence commences
to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion.
I.A.R. 14(a). While Karadza filed Rule 35 motions in both of the underlying cases, he did so on
the same date he filed his notices of appeal, forty-six days after the judgment and order from which
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he is appealing, not within fourteen days as required to terminate the time to file an appeal. (48179
R., p. 51; 48178, p. 133.) Karadza’s notices of appeal were therefore untimely.
Nor can Karadza contend that this Court should consider the merits of his appeal because
the notices―while untimely from the judgment in No. 48179 or from the order revoking probation
in No. 48178―were timely, premature appeals from the district court’s later denial of his Rule 35
motions. Assuming arguendo that Karadza could prematurely appeal from the denial of those
motions by filing an untimely notices from the judgment and order, that would still only permit
review of the denial of the Rule 35 motions. See State v. Alberts, 124 Idaho 489, 490, 861 P.2d
59, 60 (1993) (where notice of appeal was timely from denial of Rule 35 motion but not from the
original judgment and sentence, limiting review to the former). But Karadza has not asked this
Court to review the denial of his Rule 35 motions and has not argued that the district court erred
by denying them. His brief does not even mention that the motions were filed, much less discuss
the merits of the district court’s orders denying them or cite and apply the appropriate legal
standards. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) There is good reason for that. “When presenting a
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Karadza submitted no new or additional
information and so his Rule 35 motions were meritless. (48179 R., p. 51; 48178, p. 133.) But
regardless of the merits or the reason Karadza has not addressed the Rule 35 motions on appeal,
issues not raised in the opening brief are waived for purposes of appeal, as are issues not supported
by argument and authority. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 517, 363 P.3d 348,
358 (2009); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Even if the notices of
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appeal might have permitted review of the denial of his Rule 35 motions, Karadza waived the issue
by failing to address it, by failing to cite applicable authority, and by failing to make any argument.
Karadza’s only argument on appeal is that the district court erred by imposing the sentence
in No. 48179 and by revoking his probation and executing the underlying sentence in No. 48178.
Because he did not timely appeal from the judgment of conviction in No. 48179 or from the order
revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence in No. 48178, this Court should decline
to consider the merits of his appeal and dismiss.
II.
Karadza Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
This Court should affirm in both of the consolidated appeals if it concludes it has

jurisdiction to reach the merits. The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion, nor did
it abuse its discretion by revoking Karadza’s probation and executing his sentence.
In March of 2020, Karadza was on probation for a burglary conviction entered in February
of 2019―with a suspended, underlying sentence of ten years with two years fixed―when the state
moved for a probation violation for a variety of reasons, including use of narcotics, failure to
maintain employment, failure to complete drug treatment, absconding from supervision, failure to
pay fines and fees, failure to pay restitution. (48178 R., pp. 25-26, 56-60, 94-99.) A month later,
in April of 2020, Karadza was charged with four counts of burglary and four counts of grand theft
arising out of four occasions in January and February of 2020 when he entered Fred Meyer stores
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and stole purses containing financial transaction cards. (48179 R., pp. 8-10, 27-29; Conf. Exs., pp.
5-73. 1)
With respect to the alleged probation violations, Karadza admitted that he violated
probation by using narcotics and failing to successfully complete treatment. (48178 R., p. 121;
3/25/20 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 2-20.)
With respect to the new charges, Karadza accepted a plea agreement pursuant to which he
would plead guilty to one count of grand theft, the state would recommend no more than ten years
with two years fixed to run concurrently with the sentence underlying his probation in No. 48178,
and the two matters would be consolidated for sentencing and disposition. (48179 R., pp. 40-41;
5/22/20 Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 6, L. 3.) The district court accept the guilty plea. (48179 R., pp. 40-41;
5/22/20 Tr., p. 11, L. 21 – p. 13, L. 4.)
The sentencing on the burglary charge and disposition of the probation violation were
consolidated. (48178 R., p. 127.) At the joint sentencing/disposition hearing, the district court
revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentence of ten years with two years fixed, and, on
the grand theft conviction, imposed and executed a concurrent sentence of nine years with two
years fixed. (6/3/20 Tr., p. 14, L. 22 – p. 16, L. 12; 48178 R., pp. 129-31; 48179 R., pp. 44-46.)
Karadza filed untimely notices of appeal in both matters. (48179 R., pp. 53-55; 48178 R., pp. 13537.)
On appeal Karadza contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation in No. 48178 and by imposing an excessive sentence in No. 48179. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 2-6.) If the merits of the argument are addressed, no abuse of discretion is shown.
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References to “Conf. Exs.” are to the 110 page pdf file titled “Appeal Confidential Exhibits 1110-2020 . . .”
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B.

Standard of Review
“Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation

is within the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256
(2007). Likewise, where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of
showing a clear abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.” State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Abuse of discretion
review asks whether the district court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.” State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018). There is no dispute
here that Karadza violated his probation and that his sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-4.)
C.

Karadza Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion
To establish an abuse of sentencing discretion, the appellant must show the sentence is

excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628. A
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.
Id. The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights
when deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825,
965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “‘In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v.
6

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion
by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
“Probation may be revoked if the judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that
probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purposes.” State v. Reine, 122 Idaho 928, 930, 841
P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1992).
In support of his claim that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation
and imposing the sentence it did, Karadza claims that his crimes “are drive by his addiction” and
he has been “taking steps to confront that addiction” while incarcerated on the instant charges.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) Karadza has not shown an abuse of discretion.
As the district court noted at the sentencing/disposition hearing, the court was very familiar
with Karadza over years during which he was given repeated but squandered opportunities on
supervised release, through the retained jurisdiction program, and in the drug court to address his
addiction and refrain from criminal conduct. (6/3/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-6. See also 6/3/20 Tr., p. 6,
L. 16 – p. 8, L. 13 (prosecutor recounting Karadza’s many failed opportunities to comply with
probation).) In 2014, Karadza pled guilty to burglary, received a withheld judgment, and was
placed on probation for eight years. (Conf. Exs., pp. 91-95.) He was convicted of attempted petit
theft and petit theft in 2015 and 2017, respectively. (Supp. Conf. Exs., p. 3. 2) In 2017, he was
convicted again of burglary and the district court retained jurisdiction. (Conf. Exs., pp. 99-102.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended his sentence and ordered
eight years of probation. (Conf. Exs., pp. 105-08.) Roughly a year later, in 2019, Karadza was
convicted again of burglary, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years with two years fixed,
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“Supp. Conf. Exs.” refers to the file titled “Supplemental Confidential Exhibits – PSI.pdf.”
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but suspended that sentence in favor of five years of probation contingent on successful completion
of a drug court program. (48178 R., pp. 56-60.) Karadza then failed to appear for drug court and
absconded from supervision. (48178 R., pp. 64-66, 74-79.) The district court revoked probation,
but again retained jurisdiction. (48178 R., pp. 83-85.) After the period of retained jurisdiction,
Karadza was again granted probation, this time for a period of ten years. (48178 R., pp. 88-91.)
Karadza almost immediately violated probation by using narcotics and failing to complete
treatment. (48178 R., pp. 94-96, 121.) And, of course, in January of 2020, again, almost
immediately after being placed on his most recent period of probation, he committed the additional
grand theft of which he was convicted in No. 48179. (41879 R., pp. 44-46.)
Notwithstanding Karadza’s claim that this time he is taking his rehabilitation seriously, the
district court had excellent reason to conclude that Karadza was not a good candidate for probation,
and that the goals of protecting society and rehabilitating Karadza could be served only by his
receiving treatment in an incarcerated setting. When Karadza was convicted of burglary in 2019,
he told the court that he recognized his problem with drugs, recognized the importance of avoiding
additional criminal conduct, and wanted to mature. (Supp. Conf. Exs., p. 5.) When he received
probation, he then promptly avoided drug treatment that was a condition of his probation and
committed additional criminal conduct. He told the district court here the same thing. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 5.) Karadza has proven over and over again that he is not a good candidate for probation,
and that he is a danger to the community and cannot be rehabilitated on supervised release. That
Karadza has allegedly performed well in jail does not, as Karadza contends, support his argument
that the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) Karadza successfully
completed multiple periods of retained jurisdiction. It seems clear that Karadza can do well while
incarcerated. What is equally clear, though, is that Karadza fails miserably when on supervised
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release in the community. The district court correctly recognized that, after a large number of
opportunities to rehabilitate through the retained jurisdiction program, probation, and drug courts,
the concurrent sentences executed were necessary for purposes of rehabilitation and to protect the
community.
Karadza has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation
and executing his underlying sentence in No. 48178, and imposing a concurrent sentence of nine
years with two years fixed for his grand theft conviction in No. 48179.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

AVW/dd

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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